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Abstract
The Asian financial crisis spread its effect quickly across a number of coun-
tries. Korea faced serious problems in her financial and corporate sectors. This
paper considers the performance of Korean nationwide banks before, during, and
immediately after the Asian financial crisis. The performance of Korean nation-
wide banks took a big hit in 1998. Most banks recovered somewhat in 1999 with
the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. Several factors pos-
sess strong correlations with bank performance. Among other standard findings,
equity to assets correlates positively with bank performance, even when the gov-
ernment recapitalized a number of institutions that performed poorly. The Asian
crisis did not affect the normal rules of good bank management. The government,
however, directly intervened in the banking sector on a large scale to limit the
scope of the crisis in the Korean economy.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G1, G2
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 I. Introduction: 
The Asian financial crisis began July 2, 1997 with a devaluation of the Thai baht and quickly 
spread to other Asian countries. Later, Korea abandoned its defense of the Won November 17, 
1997. The effects of the crisis on countries differed in its intensity. For example, some Asian 
economies did not reap the full whirlwind of dramatic consequences. According to some 
commentators, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan did not suffer as much as other countries 
because of trade and current account surpluses, significant holdings of foreign exchange 
reserves, and the relative absence of “crony capitalism” (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 2001). 
 Analysts suggest that the Asian financial crisis differs from prior crises in the importance 
of foreign lending. That is, recent capital flows into many Asian countries in response to the 
Asian miracle quickly exited once the crisis emerged. The loss of lending so quickly plunged 
financial institutions and corporations into a liquidity crisis. Moreover, some analysts (e.g., 
Radelet and Sachs 1998) cite the initial IMF rescue programs that required credit tightening as 
contributing to the severity of the problems. 
 The Korean situation possesses some important characteristics. Basic macroeconomic 
fundamentals were not signaling imminent danger (Cho and Hong, 2001; Hahm and Mishkin, 
2000; Noland, 2000). Korea experienced an investment boom in the manufacturing sector rather 
than a real estate boom that characterized other Asian economies. Moreover, the investment 
boom was financed with significant amounts of short-term capital inflows. The precarious 
position of the chaebols along with the regulation and supervision of Korean banks by the 
government set the stage for significant problems with the Asian financial crisis emerged. 
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  Our paper considers the performance of Korean nationwide banks prior to, during, and 
immediately after the Asian financial crisis.1 We examine how the profitability of these 
nationwide banks differ and identify factors that explain these differences. Our paper also adds 
significant value in two areas. First, we assemble probably the best panel data set on Korean 
nationwide banks during the1990s. Second, we capitalize on that panel data structure and 
employ the fixed-effect regression technique. 
 Korean nationwide banks suffered a dramatic decline in performance in 1998. Most 
banks recovered somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of 
Seoul. Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Equity to assets 
correlates positively with bank performance. That correlation emerges even though the Korean 
government injected massive amounts of equity capital into the large, poor-performing banks. 
Non-interest income to interest income associates positively with bank performance and non-
interest expense to interest expense associates negatively. Provisions for loan losses correlates 
negatively with bank performance. Finally, full-time employees associate positively with bank 
performance, which probably reflects the effects of poor bank performance on bank employment. 
That is, nationwide banks downsized in 1998 as bank performance deteriorated. 
 The next section identifies those factors that characterize the Asian financial crisis, in 
general, and the Korea crisis, in particular. Section III discusses the data sources and describes 
the situation in the banking sector just before, during, and immediately after the Asian financial 
crisis. Section IV investigates the performance of Korean nationwide banks using panel 
regression techniques. Finally, Section V concludes. 
                                                 
1 We do not consider the performance of the small-sized Korean regional banks or foreign banks operating in 
Korea. Jeon and Miller (2002) compare the performance of nationwide, regional, and foreign banks in Korea before, 
during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis. 
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 II. Asian Financial Crisis and the Korean Experience 
This section discusses prevailing views about the Asian financial crisis, in general, and the 
Korean experience, in particular. We begin with a depiction of the Asian financial crisis and 
conclude with the analysis of the Korean situation. 
Asian Financial Crisis2 
The Asian financial crisis is but the latest in a series of similar events that have affected the 
world’s economy in the 1990s – for example, the 1994 Mexican peso collapse and the resulting 
turmoil in Latin America. Several studies (e.g., Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 2001, Kaminsky 
and Reinhart 2001, and Tornell 2001) have examined those crises to determine whether they 
were due to “fundamentals” or “contagion.” That is, were the countries that experienced a 
financial crisis vulnerable to such an event because of weak macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., 
weak growth, high inflation, low foreign exchange reserves, troubled banking systems, and so 
on)? Or were they the “innocent” victims of a financial panic (contagion) that damaged 
countries’ economies regardless of the strength of the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals? 
 The papers in Ito and Krueger (2001) examine the causes and consequences of the Asian 
financial crisis with comparisons to similar prior crises. That research reaches a consensus on 
several issues surrounding financial crises, in general, and the Asian crisis, in particular.  
 While contagion plays a role in the spread of a financial crisis, the magnitude of the 
negative effects experienced by countries in a crisis depends crucially on their macroeconomic 
                                                 
2 This section incorporates material from Ito and Krueger (2001), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001), Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2001), Tornell (2001), and Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
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 fundamentals. Thus, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan escaped the more dramatic costs of the 
Asian financial crisis because of relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals.3 
 One factor plays a major role in the Asian financial crisis vis-à-vis other similar events -- 
the importance of foreign bank lending (Radelet and Sachs 1998, Cho and Hong 2001, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 2001, and Tornell 2001). Banks supplied much credit to domestic firms. 
Domestic banks came to rely more heavily on foreign bank lending. When the crisis reared its 
head, the supply of foreign lending evaporated quickly, confronting the domestic banks with a 
liquidity crisis. Further, some analysts argue that the initial International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
rescue programs by requiring credit tightening worsened the liquidity crisis (Radelet and Sachs 
1998). 
 Many Asian countries also possessed elements of “crony capitalism.” Thus, the financial 
crisis caused some important corporate borrowers to default on their loans to the banks. This 
negative shock was reinforced and compounded by the loss of foreign lending to domestic banks. 
Impending bank failures necessitated the intervention by the central bank to assist in finding 
potential merger partners (possibly foreign) or to take over operations of the failed banks itself. 
Korean Situation4 
When the Asian financial crisis hit, the Korean macroeconomic fundamentals were not overly 
weak – high growth, low inflation, and low current account deficits – but were also not overly 
strong – low international reserves and low foreign direct investment relative to gross domestic 
product (Cho and Hong, 2001). Moreover, poor Korean government regulation and supervision 
of the banking system generated a structural vulnerability in the banking and financial markets 
                                                 
3 For example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001) argue that “Financial and currency crises thus become 
indissolubly interwoven in an emerging economy characterized by weak cyclical performances, low foreign 
exchange reserves, and financial deficiencies eventually resulting in high shares of non-performing loans.” (p. 7) 
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 that aided and abetted the negative consequences of the Asian crisis. Furthermore, the 
bankruptcies of several chaebols (e.g., Kia, Hanbo, Haitai, Sammi, and Daewoo) along with 
standstill agreements and syndicated loans to a number of other chaebols prompted the flight of 
foreign lending, especially foreign bank lending. Within the banking system, the government 
began looking for potential merger partners for two, “too-big-to-fail” major banks (Korea First 
and Seoul). A foreign buyer did eventually acquire Korea First and the government still seeks a 
merger partner for Seoul.5 
 Hahm and Mishkin (2000) paint a portrait of the Korean economy consistent with Cho 
and Hong’s (2001) picture. Hahm and Mishkin (2000) separate fundamentals into 
macroeconomic and balance sheet categories. The macroeconomic fundamentals signaled a well-
managed economy where as the balance sheet fundamentals suggested vulnerability to the Asian 
financial crisis. They discuss balance sheet fundamentals in three categories – the overall 
economy, the financial sector, and the corporate sector.6 
 Noland (2000) also provides elaboration on many of the points just raised. He 
differentiates the Korean crisis from other Southeast Asian crises in that the Korean investment 
boom occurred in the manufacturing sector, especially the chaebols, rather than in real estate and 
that investment growth was funded in large part by short-run capital inflows. That is, short-term 
capital controls were liberalized while the long-term controls were not. Noland argues that the 
initial IMF program exacerbated problems by confusing the Asian financial crisis with the earlier 
Latin American crisis. The Asian crisis differed according to Noland, because the corporate 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 This section employs material from Cho and Hong (2001), Hahm and Mishkin (2000), and Noland (2000). 
5 Currently, the Korean government holds 100 percent of Seoul’s shares – Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
97.7 percent and the Ministry of Finance and Economy the remaining 2.3 percent. 
6 For example, Hahm and Mishkin (2000) state that Korea’s “rate of short-term external liabilities to official foreign 
exchange reserves had risen to nearly 280%” (p. 14) by 1996. 
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 expansion was loan, not equity, based. Thus, the financial crisis raised interest rates, triggering a 
liquidity crisis. The IMF’s prescription to tighten credit worsened the liquidity crisis. 
III. History of Korean Bank Structure and Descriptive Analysis 
Our balance sheet and income statement data for Korean banks come from Bank Management 
Statistics, published annually by the Financial Supervisory Services. Sixteen nationwide banks 
enter our database for at least one year in the sample from 1991 through 1999.7 Several bank 
entrances, mergers, acquisitions, and conversions occurred over the sample period. The Asian 
financial crisis threw a roadblock across the path of deregulation and privatization of the 
financial sector begun by the Korean government and the Bank of Korea in the early 1980s.8 
During the 1960s and 1970s, major components of the Korean financial system were 
nationalized. Lending was targeted toward favored sectors (and firms), such as exports and 
heavy industries (Bank of Korea 1994). Plans to deregulate the financial system and place 
Korean commercial banks in the private sector began in the early 1980s. 
 Our database includes information on the asset and liability holdings and income and 
expense information of Korean nationwide banks. Before performing more rigorous analysis of 
the database, we first provide an overview discussion of a number of key variables related to 
bank performance over the 1991 to 1999 period. 
                                                 
7 The banks include Cho-Hung, Sang-Up, Korea First, Hanil, Seoul, Korea Exchange, Kook-Min, Housing & 
Commercial, Shinhan, Hanmi (KORAM), Dong-Wha, Dong-Nam, Dae-Dong, Hana, Boram, and Pyong-Wha 
(Peace Bank of Korea). 
8 Bank of Korea (1990) and Gilbert and Wilson (1998) provide valuable background information on the issues. 
Deregulation in the early 1980s expanded the power of commercial banks. Commercial banks could now, for 
example, offer credit cards, issue negotiable certificates of deposit, provide automated teller machines, and so on. 
Simultaneously, foreign exchange controls and restrictions on foreign ownership of Korean assets eased. The 
government’s hand was, nonetheless, still a potent force, controlling interest rates on certain types of loans and 
deposits. Further, the government’s informal credit policy continued to favor selected sectors. Gilbert and Wilson 
(1998) argue that the Korean commercial banking system was in critical condition in the mid-1980s with significant 
levels of bad loans. No Korean bank failed at this time, however, as charge-off rates for bad loans were slow 
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  While the Asian financial crisis precipitated the dramatic domestic economic crisis in 
Korea, more fundamental causes were at fault.9 The corporate sector overextended itself with too 
much investment and borrowing. Commercial banks relied too heavily on short-term foreign 
lending as a source of funds. Finally, the lack of transparency of balance sheets, income 
statements, and management practices all led to a crisis of confidence in Korean institutions. In 
sum, the Korean economy was an “accident waiting to happen.”10 
 Table 1 reports the returns on assets and equity for the nationwide banks in our sample. 
Several observations emerge. First, the Asian financial crisis dramatically affected the returns on 
assets and equity with Cho-Hung, Korea First, Hanil, Seoul, Dong-Wha, Dong-Nam, Dae-Dong, 
and Pyong-Wha each experiencing a more than 10 percent rate of loss on equity in 1997. With 
the exception of Cho-Hung and Pyong-Wha, these banks either disappeared through merger or 
were “too big too fail” and received assistance from the Bank of Korea, who began looking for 
foreign merger partners. Moreover, with few exceptions, the performance of all banks in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enough to maintain individual bank viability. No such luck (skill) graced the Korean commercial banking industry 
during the Asian financial crisis. 
9 The next few paragraphs rely on information from Bank of Korea (1998). 
10 Korea First and Seoul became insolvent during the Asian financial crisis. They were seen as “too-big-to-fail” 
institutions. Thus, the government nationalized and recapitalized them in January 1998. The Bank of Korea sought 
private (foreign) buyers for both banks after recapitalization. After protracted negotiations, Newbridge Capital 
acquired Korea First in December 1999. Seoul still sits on the auction block. Having determined that Korea First 
and Seoul were too-big-to-fail, the Monetary Board of the Bank of Korea in February 1998 identified 12 of the 
remaining 24 Korean banks as falling below the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy 
requirement of 8 percent. Nationwide banks with capital ratios above 8 percent included Kook-Min, Housing & 
Commercial, Shinhan, Hanmi, Hana, and Boram. Further, those nationwide banks with capital ratios between 6 and 
8 percent included Cho-Hung, Hanil, Korea Exchange, and Sang-Up. Finally, nationwide banks with capital ratios 
below 6 percent included Dong-Wha, Dong-Nam, Dae-Dong, and Pyong-Wha. The Bank of Korea (1998) stated 
that the “… Monetary Board (renamed the Monetary Policy Committee from April 1, 1998) issued orders or 
recommendations for management improvement measures to the twelve commercial banks other than Korea First 
Bank and Seoul Bank that had had BIS capital adequacy ratios of less than 8% at the end of 1997.” (p. 9). After 
examining the financial conditions of those twelve banks, the Financial Supervisory Commission ordered the 
closure of three Korean nationwide banks, since they were seen as having little chance of recovering. Those banks 
were closed through purchase and assumptions (P&As) where the acquiring banks assumed the liabilities and 
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 returns on assets or equity deteriorated further in 1998. The exceptions – Hanmi and Hana – both 
experienced an increase in the rates of return on assets and equity in 1998.11 The hardest hit 
banks were Korea First and Seoul. But, Cho-Hung, Sang-Up, Hanil, Boram, and Pyong-Wha 
also experienced extremely bad performance in 1998 with Pyong-Wha having the largest rate of 
loss on equity, exceeding that of Korea First and Seoul.12 For those banks with negative returns 
on assets in 1998, every bank experienced an improvement in its return on assets in 1999, except 
Seoul.13 
 Researchers suggest that foreign lending to domestic banks played an important role in 
the Asian financial crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998, Cho and Hong 2001, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
2001, and Tornell 2001). That is, the Asian crisis precipitated a loss of foreign-source liabilities, 
exerting strong pressure on those banks with an illiquid asset base. If accurate, then we expect to 
see retrenchment in bank portfolios – declining assets and/or deposits. We do not observe such 
movements by in large for the Korean nationwide banks.  
 Table 2 reports consolidated balance sheet information for Korean nationwide banks. 
Total assets climbed continually from 1991 through 1998, and fell only slightly in 1999. 
Deposits also climbed steadily over the entire 1991 to 1999 period. In short, the consolidated 
balance sheet of the Korean nationwide banks does not provide much ammunition for the 
hypothesis that the withdrawal of foreign-source liabilities played a significant role in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
purchased only the “sound” assets. The actual June 1998 P&As included Kook-Min acquiring Dae-Dong, Housing 
& Commercial acquiring Dong-Nam, and Shinhan acquiring Dong-Wha. 
11 Shinhan saw its return on equity rise from 2.39 to 2.60 percent, but its return on assets fall from 0.22 to 0.19 
percent. 
12 Using the rate of return on assets, Pyong-Wha ranked third from the bottom ahead of Korea First and Seoul. 
13 The return on assets for Seoul fell to –11.45 percent and the return on equity dropped dramatically to –567.64 
percent. Seoul’s 1999 balance sheet and income statement data provide information seemingly at odds with the rest 
of the nationwide banks. We revisit this observation when we consider the econometric analysis in the next section. 
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 Korean economic woes after the Asian financial crisis. If foreign-source liabilities were 
withdrawn from Korean nationwide banks, then such loses were replaced from domestic sources. 
 To offer a related insight to that last observation, Table 2 also reports information on 
foreign-currency loans and foreign-currency deposits. Both items, measured in Won, decrease 
after the Asian financial crisis. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the lost loans and 
deposits were domestic or foreign residents, since that data are not available. 
 The holding of foreign-currency loans and foreign-currency deposits do expose banks to 
foreign exchange risk as long as foreign-currency loans exceed, or fall short of, foreign-currency 
deposits. For example, if foreign-currency loans exceed foreign-currency deposits, then a 
weakening Won increases the Won value of foreign-currency loans more than deposits, adding 
to the equity base. Of course, a strengthening Won squeezes the equity base.14 We note that 
foreign-currency loans and deposits rise and fall together with those loans exceeding deposits in 
every year except 1997. 
 By in large, Korean nationwide banks did respond to the shocks from the Asian financial 
crisis to the extent that they could respond. In general, loans did not change by much between 
1997 and 1998 while securities nearly doubled (see Table 2) as banks tried to reduce the income 
risk that they faced. Loans and securities both showed modest increases in 1999, keeping the 
new post-1997 distribution between the two relatively constant. 
 The number of domestic branches of nationwide banks and the number of full-time 
employees (see Table 2) responded to events in 1997. Bank managers modified the decline in 
bank performance by reducing the number of branches somewhat and dramatically reducing the 
number of full-time employees in 1998. The number of branches and full-time employees 
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 stabilized between 1998 and 1999 with branches still falling, but by a smaller amount, and full-
time employees increasing marginally. 
IV. Explaining Korean Nationwide Bank Performance 
Our data include all nationwide banks in operation in any year from 1991 to 1999. Since some 
banks entered and/or exited over the sample period, we have an unbalanced panel data set of 124 
observations – 144 observations with 20 missing values. The data include balance sheet and 
income statement data on these banks. In addition, we collected some macroeconomic 
information that change over time, but do not differ between banks at a point in time. 
 Our econometric investigation looks for possible correlations between the balance sheet 
and income statement information as well as the macroeconomic data, and our measures of bank 
performance returns on assets and equity. Our results divide into sets of three regressions. In 
each set, the first regression considers five different types of individual bank explanatory 
variables: (1) portfolio distribution variables -- loans to assets, securities to assets, deposits to 
assets, and equity to assets; (2) income distribution variables – non-interest income to interest 
income and non-interest expense to interest expense; (3) a risk variable – provision for loan 
losses to loans; (4) factor inputs – number of branches and full-time employees; and (5) a scale 
variable – total assets. The second regression broadens the portfolio distribution variables and 
adds two variables to capture the distribution of loans -- won-denominated loans and foreign-
currency loans to total loans15 -- and two variables to capture the distribution of deposits – time 
deposits to won-denominated deposits and foreign-currency-denominated deposits to total 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 The database does not provide the breakdown of foreign-currency loans and deposits into individual currencies.  
15 Total loans also include domestic import usance loans and advances for customers. 
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 deposits.16 The third regression broadens the loan distribution variables by adding the fractions of 
won-denominated loans in real estate (housing), consumer (household), and commercial 
categories (enterprises).17 
 We perform these three regressions with progressively finer disaggregations both with 
and without the macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic variables include the 
unemployment rate, the rate of growth of real gross domestic product, the rate of depreciation of 
the Won, the fiscal budget surplus as a fraction of nominal gross domestic product, and the rate 
of inflation in the consumer price index.18 
 The standard method in empirical bank studies estimates regression equations with 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), which assumes that the omitted variables are independent 
of the regressors and are independently, identically distributed. Such estimation, however, can 
create problems of interpretation if bank-specific characteristics, such as bank management, that 
affect performance are not considered. If those omitted bank-specific variables (both observed 
and unobserved) correlate with the explanatory variables, then pooled OLS produces biased and 
inconsistent coefficient estimates (see Hsiao, 1986). Using panel data, however, the fixed-effect 
model produces unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients.19 
 The fixed-effect model assumes that differences across banks reflect parametric shifts in 
the regression equation. Such an interpretation becomes more appropriate when the problem at 
                                                 
16 The data divide won-denominated deposits into demand and time and savings deposits while total deposits divide 
into won-denominated and foreign-currency-denominated deposits. 
17 The other categories of loans incorporated under won-denominated loans include loans to the public sector and 
loans to special savings. 
18 We also repeat all regressions where we add an Asian financial crisis dummy variable (coded one in 1997, 1998, 
and 1999; zero otherwise) and interact it with each independent variable to see if the effects change significantly 
between the pre- and post-Asian crisis. Generally, the findings are not altered by the Asian financial crisis. We 
report where the results differ in the footnotes. 
19 Other methods of excluding unobserved country-specific variables estimates the first-differenced regression and 
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 hand uses the whole population, rather than a sample from it. Since our sample considers all 16 
Korean nationwide banks over a particular time period, we adopt the fixed-effect model for our 
analysis if the omitted country-specific variables correlate with the included regressors. 
 Before reporting the regression results, some background discussion on the sequence of 
events in our research will provide useful information. When we originally collected the data and 
began the econometric analysis (early 2000), the 1999 data were not yet available. Those data 
became available in June 2000. As a result, we originally performed our fixed effect regressions 
using 1991 to 1998 data and then updated our analysis with the 1991 to 1999 data set. 
 Several important general differences emerged in the two sets of results. First, the 1991 
to 1998 data provide a much better fit as well as a larger number of significant variables. Second, 
the 1991 to 1998 data produce significant effects for the macroeconomic variables (available on 
request); the 1991 to 1999 data do not. Finally, the 1991 to 1999 data generate coefficient 
estimates that sometimes change signs from their 1991 to 1998 counterparts, leading to 
counterintuitive effects. 
 Such large changes in results from adding data from 1999, with hindsight, seems a 
probable outcome, since the post-Asian-financial-crisis data are much noisier. The government’s 
hand in nationalization of several institutions and in recapitalizing many others likely altered 
normal relationships. A quick look at Table 1 suggests that amongst the nationwide banks, Seoul 
appears to have followed a different path in 1999. Seoul’s returns on assets and equity 
deteriorated further in 1999 when other banks experienced some relief from the difficulties in 
1998. Moreover, while the government finally found a foreign purchaser for Korea First, Seoul 
remains at the alter awaiting a proper suitor. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the random-effects model (see Hsiao 1986, and Westbrook and Tybout 1993). 
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  We delete the 1999 Seoul observation, converting our data set to an unbalanced panel of 
144 with 21 missing values. The sign-reversing coefficients and counterintuitive effects now 
disappear. The regressions for 1991 to 1999 still do not have as good a fit and the 
macroeconomic variables still are generally not significant. The lack of significant effects from 
the macroeconomic variables probably reflects the fact that the macroeconomic fundamentals 
were important pre-Asian financial crisis, but not so after. The government’s role in the financial 
sector had diminished since the 1980s only to be reversed by the Asian financial crisis. So it may 
not be surprising that macroeconomic variables provide less explanatory power of bank 
performance once the years following the Asian financial crisis are added to the data. 
 Table 3 and 4 report the regression results for returns on assets and equity, respectively, 
excluding the 1999 Seoul observation. We provide comments to indicate when the 1991 to 1998 
results differ from those in Tables 3 and 4. Several observations deserve mention. First, higher 
capital adequacy (equity to assets) associates positively with both the rates of return (return on 
assets and equity). That result emerges even as the government recapitalized several banks. That 
is, banks with significant financial problems receive an injection of new equity that should raise 
the equity to asset ratio. Such recapitalizations presumably impart a negative correlation. Thus, 
the highly significant and positive association between capital adequacy and rates of return must 
offset this government-induced negative association.20 
 Second, non-interest income to interest income possesses a strong positive correlation 
with the rates of return on assets and equity while non-interest expense to interest expense 
possesses a strong negative correlation. Banks perform better as they increase their income 
                                                 
20 Moreover, the positive effect of equity to assets on return on equity strengthens after the Asian financial crisis 
begins. That is, the interaction of the equity to assets variables with the Asian financial crisis dummy variables is 
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 emanating from non-interest sources and reduce their expenses from non-interest sources. We 
know that banks reacted to the crisis by economizing initially on full-time employees and 
branches – two components of non-interest expense. Further, interest income associates with 
bank lending in large part. The problems of nonperforming loans are lessened in those banks that 
rely less on interest income. 
 Third, provisions for loan losses to total loans has a strong negative correlation with the 
returns on assets and equity, not a surprising result. The provision for loan losses crudely signals 
the riskiness of banks. Thus, higher loan loss provisions signal higher risk and associates 
negatively with bank returns.21 
 Fourth, the number of full-time employees has a strong positive correlation with the 
returns on assets and equity. Significant downsizing in full-time employees has been one 
response to the poor performance of Korean nationwide banks. Thus, that positive correlation 
probably reflects the decline in full-time employees necessitated by the fall in the return on 
assets and equity. In other words, we suspect reverse causality – low performance prompts lower 
full-time employment. It does not suggest that hiring more full-time employees will boost bank 
returns, quite the contrary.22 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
significantly positive in the return on equity regression. 
21 That negative effect reflects the situation after the Asian financial crisis. That is, the provision for loan losses 
interacted with the Asian financial crisis dummy variable possesses a significant negative coefficient while the 
coefficient of provision for loan losses by itself that reflects the pre-crisis period of 1991 to 1996 is no longer 
significant.  
22 The 1991 to 1998 data produce a strong positive correlation between the number of bank branches and the 
returns on assets and equity (not shown, available on request). Banks again reduced branches in response to 
declining bank performance in 1998. That significant positive effect disappears when we add the 1999 data. 
 15
  Finally, the evidence for other significant variables in the return on assets and equity 
regressions is spotty and not persistent across the various specifications. Moreover, those 
variables that are significant tend to be so at a lower level (i.e., 10-percent level).23 
V. Conclusion 
The Asian financial crisis is but one of a series of recent crises that have hit the world’s 
economies. Analysts suggest that it differ from prior crises in the importance of foreign lending. 
Moreover, others (e.g., Radelet and Sachs 1998) cite the initial IMF rescue programs that 
required credit tightening as contributing to the severity of the problems. The problems in Korea 
mirrored many of the problems confronted by other countries. The financial institutions needed 
recapitalization and restructuring. Furthermore, a number of important chaebols faced imminent 
default on their obligations. 
 We focus on the performance of Korean nationwide banks before, during, and 
immediately after the Asian financial crisis. The two largest banks – Korea First and Seoul – 
were seen as too-big-to-fail. The government sought foreign buyers for those banks. It took 
nearly two years to reach agreement with Newbridge Capital to acquire Korea First. As of this 
writing, Seoul was still on the auction block. Government assistance was given to a number of 
banks to facilitate an acquisition by other Korean banks. 
 The performance of Korean nationwide banks took a big hit in 1998. Most banks 
recovered somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. 
Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Equity to assets correlates 
                                                 
23 The macroeconomic variables are generally significant for the 1991 to 1998 sample period (not shown, available 
on request). An appreciating won has a strong positive correlation with the returns on assets and equity. A higher 
fiscal surplus to gross domestic product and a higher inflation rate in the consumer price index possess a positive 
correlation with performance. A higher growth rate of real gross domestic product associates with lower 
performance. Unemployment, however, does not significantly affect performance, even for the 1991 to 1998 period. 
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 positively with bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number of 
institutions that performed poorly. Non-interest income to interest income associates positively 
with bank performance and non-interest expense to interest expense associates negatively. 
Provisions for loan losses correlates negatively with bank performance as one expects. Finally, 
full-time employees associates positively with bank performance, which at first thought seems 
counterintuitive. As noted in the text, that effect probably reflects the effects of poor bank 
performance on bank employment. That is, nationwide banks downsized significantly in 1998 as 
bank performance deteriorated.  
 Our findings suggest that the normal rules associated with sound bank management were 
not overturned or repealed by the Asian financial crisis. The government, however, was required 
to intervene to prevent the crisis from lengthening or from spreading more deeply into the 
Korean economy. The future health of the banking system requires serious restructuring of the 
past linkages between banks, chaebols, and the government. Banks must freely pursue their own 
corporate goals and must not have their actions tied by decisions by the other two groups. 
 In sum, the Korean economy and financial sector has so far weathered a huge financial 
storm. But the oceans are not yet safe; the storm continues. Much progress has occurred in 
restructuring the financial sector. Less progress has occurred in the restructuring of the chaebols. 
This story has not yet seen its last chapter. 
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Tables: 
 
Table 1: Rates of Return on Assets and Equity (Percentage) 
 Year 
Return on Assets 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.71 0.47 0.40 -0.82 -5.32 -1.86 
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 0.43 0.18 0.05 0.29 0.44 0.42 -0.52 -5.08 -3.15 
Korea First 0.71 0.95 0.91 0.64 0.07 0.02 -5.44 -9.05 -3.50 
Hanil 0.79 0.88 0.74 0.70 0.38 0.23 -0.84 -4.83
Seoul 0.58 0.57 0.08 0.36 0.03 -0.88 -4.01 -9.67 -11.45 
Korea Exchange 0.23 0.31 0.39 0.45 0.40 0.33 -0.16 -2.02 -1.97 
Kook-Min 0.46 0.62 0.33 0.17 0.17 
Housing & Commercial  0.36 -0.70 1.06 
Shinhan 1.72 1.54 1.37 1.24 0.84 0.75 0.22 0.19 0.32 
Hanmi (KORAM) 1.39 1.22 0.53 0.70 0.38 0.54 -0.47 0.37 0.26 
Dong-Wha 1.12 1.25 0.61 0.30 -0.61 0.15 -2.14
Dong-Nam 0.63 0.70 0.55 0.33 0.02 0.27 -0.71
Dae-Dong 0.37 0.31 0.27 -0.27 0.23 0.21 -2.02
Hana 5.50 2.62 1.71 1.33 0.91 0.87 0.52 0.82 0.55 
Boram 5.38 2.38 1.93 1.34 0.71 0.56 0.16 -4.55
Pyong-Wha 0.12 0.50 -0.75 0.19 -1.00 -7.18 -1.20 
Return on Equity 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 6.22 6.76 6.85 7.60 5.30 5.04 -11.91 -84.77 -24.72 
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 5.19 2.33 0.64 3.32 5.23 5.85 -8.57 -74.63 -39.96 
Korea First 7.36 10.53 10.14 7.43 0.82 0.29 -79.98 -138.85 -52.88 
Hanil 7.22 8.65 7.76 7.55 4.04 2.82 -12.71 -67.45
Seoul 4.95 5.39 0.81 3.70 0.32 -10.30 -52.06 -120.46 -567.64 
Korea Exchange 4.23 4.68 5.14 5.55 5.09 4.58 -2.76 -36.49 -38.84 
Kook-Min 7.70 9.33 4.11 2.46 2.80 
Housing & Commercial  3.59 -8.62 21.61 
Shinhan 9.28 9.15 9.10 9.59 6.85 6.85 2.39 2.60 3.95 
Hanmi (KORAM) 10.69 10.55 4.85 6.77 4.25 6.76 -7.26 7.59 4.53 
Dong-Wha 4.57 5.68 3.13 1.79 -4.83 1.41 -24.63
Dong-Nam 2.96 4.25 3.95 2.85 0.25 3.72 -11.88
Dae-Dong 1.54 1.73 1.85 -2.21 2.69 2.72 -32.98
Hana 12.98 9.90 10.14 10.01 7.92 8.28 5.85 11.35 8.24 
Boram 16.91 9.66 11.50 9.43 5.81 5.47 1.94 -60.72
Pyong-Wha 0.38 2.85 -6.36 2.15 -13.78 -157.36 -38.41 
Note: Data come from Financial Supervisory Services (1999, 2000). 
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 Table 2: Consolidated Nationwide Bank Balance Sheet Information 
 Year 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Assets 
 
 1148148 1285527 1412758 1702915 2223763 2672045 3698936 4163970 4118926
Securities 
 
 133385 148009 185054 243425 338019 419440 605390 1069042 1134203
Loans 
 
 599125 688480 740400 885155 1126113 1373278 1899103 1895592 1974791
Deposits 
 
 653843 718213 821741 1000889 1356638 1573399 2252714 2504439 2755938
Foreign-
Currency 
Loans 184276 204818 221813 271399 341068 429295 634456 483570 308659
Foreign-
Currency 
Deposits 149475 168962 210523 237710 273723 314895 690388 455189 300324
Domestic 
Branches 
 1931 2149 2425 2681 3476 3891 4682 4164 4040
Full-Time 
Employment 
 67518 68452 68018 67643 83335 83749 94065 64830 65865
Note:  See Table 1. Domestic branches and full-time employment equals the number of branches and full-time 
employees. All other variables are measured in missions of Won. 
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 Table 3: Panel Regressions of Return on Assets: 1991-1999 
Variable 
 
ROA 
L/A 0.0066 
(0.28) 
-0.0001 
(-0.00) 
-0.0092 
(-0.37) 
-0.0290 
(-1.09) 
-0.0343 
(-1.18) 
-0.0262
(-0.88)
WL/L  -0.0223 
(-0.54) 
-0.0276 
(-0.68) 
 -0.0528 
(-1.27) 
-0.0476
(-1.14)
REL/WL   0.0444 
(0.69) 
  -0.0113
(-0.16)
CL/WL   0.1162‡ 
(1.93) 
  0.0402
(0.55)
CIL/WL   0.0747 
(1.36) 
  0.0344
(0.55)
FCL/L  -0.0388 
(-0.87) 
-0.0636 
(-1.42) 
 -0.0553 
(-1.25) 
-0.0588
(-1.29)
S/A 0.0158 
(0.65) 
-0.0130 
(-0.45) 
-0.0057 
(-0.20) 
0.0083 
(0.29) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0057
(0.17)
D/A -0.0186 
(-0.78) 
-0.0242 
(-0.89) 
-0.0510 
(-1.65) 
-0.0556‡ 
(-1.81) 
-0.0604* 
(-1.98) 
-0.0595‡
(-1.75)
TD/WD  0.0303 
(1.39) 
0.0176 
(0.77) 
 0.0018 
(0.07) 
0.0070
(0.26)
FCD/D  -0.0136 
(-0.51) 
-0.0113 
(-0.43) 
 -0.0329 
(-1.13) 
-0.0340
(-1.11)
E/A 0.3197* 
(9.44) 
0.3219* 
(6.67) 
0.3129* 
(6.65) 
0.2790* 
(5.97) 
0.2576* 
(4.88) 
0.2625*
(4.94)
NII/II 0.0950* 
(5.21) 
0.0809* 
(4.08) 
0.0900* 
(4.39) 
0.0734* 
(3.69) 
0.0612* 
(2.93) 
0.0733*
(3.25)
NIE/IE -0.1489* 
(-6.26) 
-0.1433* 
(-5.49) 
-0.1490* 
(-5.59) 
-0.1261* 
(-4.56) 
-0.1180* 
(-4.21) 
-0.1283*
(-4.31)
PLL/L -0.2214* 
(-4.70) 
-0.2536* 
(-5.07) 
-0.2295* 
(-4.61) 
-0.1979* 
(-4.13) 
-0.2184* 
(-4.33) 
-0.2083*
(-4.06)
BNCH 0.0000 
(0.40) 
0.0000 
(0.40) 
0.0000 
(0.45) 
0.0000 
(0.05) 
0.0000 
(0.32) 
0.0000
(0.38)
EMPL 0.0075* 
(6.26) 
0.0075* 
(6.02) 
0.0073* 
(5.93) 
0.0067* 
(5.49) 
0.0062* 
(4.60) 
0.0063*
(4.56)
A 0.0003 
(1.10) 
0.0003 
(1.11) 
0.0022 
(0.64) 
0.0002 
(0.96) 
0.0002 
(0.79) 
0.0001
(0.50)
UNEM    0.2424 
(0.74) 
0.3990 
(1.06) 
0.2932
(0.77)
DGDP    0.0251 
(0.26) 
0.0963 
(0.81) 
0.1090
(0.90)
DEXCH    0.0168 
(0.47) 
-0.0094 
(-0.21) 
-0.0183
(-0.39)
SUR    0.3905 
(1.26) 
0.5901 
(1.58) 
0.4160
(1.06)
INF    -0.0383 
(-0.43) 
-0.0507 
(-0.53) 
-0.0559
(-0.59)
Adjusted R2 0.7561 0.7556 0.7684 0.7718 0.7718 0.7719
SEE 0.0099 0.0099 0.0097 0.0096 0.0096 0.0096
Note: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA) as a fraction. Independent individual bank variables 
include total loans to assets (L/A), won-denominated loans to loans (WL/L), real estate loans to won-
denominated loans (REL/WL), consumer loans to won-denominated loans (CL/WL), commercial and 
industrial loans to won-denominated loans (CIL/WL), foreign-currency loans to total loans (FCL/L), 
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 securities to assets (S/A), total deposits to assets (D/A), time deposits to won-denominated deposits 
(TD/WD), foreign-currency deposits to total deposits (FCD/D), non-interest income to interest income 
(NII/II), non-interest expense to interest expense (NIE/IE), provisions for loan losses to total loans 
(PLL/L), the number of branches (BNCH), employment (EMPL, in thousands), and assets (A, in billions of 
won). Independent macroeconomic variables include the unemployment rate (UNEM) as a fraction, the 
rate of growth of real GDP (DGDP) as a fraction, the rate of change in the Won per US dollar exchange 
rate (DEXCH) as a fraction, the government budget surplus to nominal gross domestic product (SUR), and 
the rate of inflation in the consumer price index (INF) as a fraction. Summary statistics include the adjusted 
R2 and the standard error of the regression (SEE). Numbers in parentheses under coefficient estimates are 
t-statistics. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level 
‡ means significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level 
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 Table 4: Panel Regressions of Return on Equity: 1991-1999 
Variable 
 
ROE 
L/A 0.5887 
(1.56) 
0.4898 
(1.22) 
0.3077 
(0.80) 
-0.0871 
(-0.21) 
-0.2472 
(-0.55) 
-0.0865
(-0.19)
WL/L  -0.2872 
(-0.43) 
-0.3793 
(-0.61) 
 -0.9254 
(-1.44) 
-0.7777
(-1.24)
REL/WL   0.5331 
(0.54) 
  -0.5250
(-0.48)
CL/WL   2.2922** 
(2.49) 
  0.8313
(0.76)
CIL/WL   1.2926 
(1.54) 
  0.3832
(0.40)
FCL/L  -0.3629 
(-0.51) 
-0.9084 
(-1.33) 
 -0.6958 
(-1.02) 
-0.8343
(-1.22)
S/A 0.5093 
(1.33) 
0.2669 
(0.58) 
0.3982 
(0.90) 
0.4368 
(0.99) 
0.4967 
(1.00) 
0.5337
(1.07)
D/A -0.1935 
(-0.51) 
-0.1524 
(-0.35) 
-0.7737 
(-1.65) 
-0.8215‡ 
(-1.81) 
-0.9137‡ 
(-1.94) 
-1.0295**
(-2.01)
TD/WD  0.3919 
(1.12) 
0.1109 
(0.32) 
 -0.2357 
(-0.60) 
-0.1869
(-0.47)
FCD/D  -0.0533 
(-0.13) 
0.0091 
(0.02) 
 -0.4334 
(-0.96) 
-0.0611
(-0.17)
E/A 3.5894* 
(6.70) 
3.9108* 
(5.07) 
3.7051* 
(5.16) 
3.0344* 
(4.22) 
2.7064* 
(3.31) 
2.8643*
(3.58)
NII/II 0.8795* 
(3.05) 
0.7700** 
(2.43) 
1.0202* 
(3.26) 
0.4933 
(1.61) 
0.3839 
(1.19) 
0.7133**
(2.10)
NIE/IE -1.9396* 
(-5.16) 
-1.9748* 
(-4.72) 
-2.1633* 
(-5.32) 
-1.6072* 
(-3.78) 
-1.5084* 
(-3.48) 
-1.8330*
(-4.09)
PLL/L -4.2666* 
(-5.73) 
-4.5539* 
(-5.69) 
-3.9670* 
(-5.22) 
-3.8918* 
(-5.28) 
-3.9660* 
(-5.09) 
-3.6662*
(-4.75)
BNCH 0.0004 
(0.75) 
0.0003 
(0.50) 
0.0003 
(0.51) 
0.0002 
(0.29) 
0.0003 
(0.50) 
0.0003
(0.45)
EMPL 0.1047* 
(5.54) 
0.1075* 
(5.41) 
0.1054* 
(5.61) 
0.0924* 
(4.89) 
0.0859* 
(4.12) 
0.0906*
(4.37)
A 0.0039 
(1.03) 
0.0046 
(1.15) 
0.0022 
(0.58) 
0.0041 
(1.04) 
0.0030 
(0.73) 
0.0016
(0.40)
UNEM    7.1659 
(1.43) 
10.5082‡ 
(1.80) 
8.0680
(1.40)
DGDP    0.7949 
(0.53) 
1.7987 
(0.98) 
1.8415
(1.01)
DEXCH    0.1833 
(0.33) 
-0.1509 
(-0.21) 
-0.2911
(-0.41)
SUR    10.5324** 
(2.22) 
14.4050** 
(2.49) 
10.4482‡
(1.77)
INF    -0.5783 
(-0.42) 
-0.9352 
(-0.63) 
-1.0796
(-0.70)
Adjusted R2 0.6924 0.6845 0.7284 0.7278 0.7247 0.7389
SEE 0.1570 0.1589 0.1475 0.1476 0.1485 0.1446
Note: See Table 3. The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE) as a fraction.  
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 Appendix: Tables 
 
Table A1: Domestic and Foreign-currency Deposits (millions of Won) 
 Year 
Deposits in Won 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 68338 70143 80211 100574 120017 138249 134991 159100 232900
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 76198 76449 78810 100016 117951 133531 125676 290421 376520
Korea First 65815 73884 79824 92726 104637 103137 98222 124360 145491
Hanil 77410 75538 74222 83647 98742 115923 120956 153333
Seoul 62138 61059 58433 72296 69888 76464 79845 88948 123102
Korea Exchange 36340 40899 47428 57972 69659 72789 88445 106684 184478
Kook-Min 146324 170612 179035 316289 411311
Housing & Commercial 134728 222436 328396
Shinhan 23167 27516 33118 43423 47694 48963 59023 128257 184508
Hanmi (KORAM) 10329 11512 10567 14955 16649 18219 25007 68026 114518
Dong-Wha 9971 15232 12556 13767 15627 14902 23901 
Dong-Nam 5245 6189 7521 7943 12527 12889 18058 
Dae-Dong 5967 6482 6666 7891 10170 11582 14160 
Hana 2795 4824 6950 10862 13583 15295 35006 75233 206439
Boram 3490 6723 5599 8742 10684 9902 26598 36048
Pyong-Wha 1943 3996 6727 8184 12086 17115 29476 49193
Deposit in Foreign Currency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 14318 16457 21785 24859 26591 38994 89831 55286 43183
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 19719 24153 30888 32021 34486 38706 84413 91009 63679
Korea First 17662 17717 23798 25261 27031 25289 80424 49279 35628
Hanil 19369 22278 30382 34490 38148 43708 96204 47672
Seoul 11783 12256 15720 18766 21413 26086 62343 37566 19985
Korea Exchange 56107 63153 64110 64068 76169 83690 153790 84164 80623
Kook-Min 4311 4190 7256 17985 10024
Housing & Commercial 7507 3166 1868
Shinhan 6268 7811 11709 15181 17737 21416 44009 34577 26257
Hanmi (KORAM) 2750 2643 3378 3974 4957 5931 11575 11736 7659
Dong-Wha 710 877 1906 4981 6015 7566 14421 
Dong-Nam 280 394 746 1656 1900 2182 8065 
Dae-Dong 420 585 1409 1857 2109 2322 4900 
Hana 39 372 1883 2981 3492 3500 7872 10702 9479
Boram 50 266 1773 4258 5312 6905 10300 8277
Pyong-Wha 1036 3357 4052 4410 7478 3770 1938
Note:  See Table 1. 
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 Table A2: Loans and Security Holdings (millions of Won) 
 Year 
Loans and Discounts 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 84564 93402 105899 124118 146003 184601 219432 170017 198750
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 94029 101730 102158 108237 115301 143930 177011 298505 345968
Korea First 85793 99891 111297 135353 142921 160800 161287 121602 97996
Hanil 73501 82473 90797 112410 126967 153193 198107 157903
Seoul 66070 73185 76647 88108 100258 109158 117899 97483 73921
Korea Exchange 112262 121936 119619 127134 147024 171408 232351 185196 186624
Kook-Min 143000 173247 208663 315193 359697
Housing & Commercial 225230 238592 298835
Shinhan 43336 56880 65289 82857 76793 117854 149229 148528 188301
Hanmi (KORAM) 11195 12641 13648 20499 23402 32292 42975 65894 91065
Dong-Wha 10346 14345 14029 22088 24494 26098 32972 
Dong-Nam 6809 8862 10464 13726 15643 19392 23602 
Dae-Dong 5909 7657 9148 12377 14042 19558 23753 
Hana 3261 8750 12515 21311 25871 34941 45927 56704 133632
Boram 2050 6728 8890 16937 24394 26806 40665 39975
Pyong-Wha 560 5030 12626 15919 17683 22164 22929 36414
Securities 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 18100 17880 22818 34202 41271 49797 58296 61807 117755
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 22682 24146 29972 40069 47073 55233 63749 167314 163387
Korea First 18839 19428 23879 33917 40111 42799 47033 57718 82607
Hanil 18734 21940 28088 34936 40667 47885 58538 77718
Seoul 10725 12866 18033 24787 30180 35811 48105 57180 80107
Korea Exchange 26321 26257 28777 28754 35521 40814 53094 78492 110278
Kook-Min 37928 50815 65537 199709 166335
Housing & Commercial 45175 93290 97505
Shinhan 8391 10433 12881 19229 26376 38849 54340 92134 121616
Hanmi (KORAM) 1639 2426 3492 4672 5620 9209 16556 74844 70203
Dong-Wha 3488 3096 4408 6912 7844 8723 13803 
Dong-Nam 1609 1906 2567 3270 6167 9828 13807 
Dae-Dong 1579 2030 2377 3759 4417 7284 8772 
Hana 930 1983 4016 3611 7174 11266 36043 65989 97054
Boram 348 1394 1677 2994 4164 5360 15146 21958
Pyong-Wha 2224 2069 2313 3506 5767 7396 20889 27357
Note:  See Table 1. 
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 Table A3: Domestic and Foreign-Currency Loans (millions of Won) 
 Year 
Loans in Won 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 58754 66488 74646 85369 94631 112351 124891 110958 154452
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 68474 72983 68599 75038 78032 94181 105964 186908 248757
Korea First 62810 70575 77540 90577 91581 104137 94280 78317 78538
Hanil 51781 57574 58974 72990 74025 84595 94539 93774
Seoul 46180 50053 53399 58679 66582 71413 70169 62680 54569
Korea Exchange 47161 53237 54281 59995 64447 76129 86979 90082 115858
Kook-Min 139284 166233 196491 281183 332768
Housing & Commercial 212473 228996 289907
Shinhan 32736 43539 50270 63829 71831 83275 96118 108858 154134
Hanmi (KORAM) 9016 9638 10794 16888 18110 23598 27334 53599 81135
Dong-Wha 9898 13827 12969 17619 18973 18523 20495 
Dong-Nam 6386 8167 9719 12222 14129 17701 19900 
Dae-Dong 4954 6255 7752 10649 12313 17334 19383 
Hana 3252 8472 11898 19168 23577 31473 40394 51625 122804
Boram 1979 6548 8102 13153 18684 19581 28975 31428
Pyong-Wha 560 4209 9420 11879 13534 16937 19576 33219
Loans in Foreign Currency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 23067 23885 28876 37563 49993 70633 91507 53300 38444
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 23486 25973 27657 28161 31975 44546 65453 106985 85397
Korea First 22034 27853 31136 41721 48271 51590 63976 35546 17311
Hanil 20540 23389 29362 36343 50420 65450 99474 61718
Seoul 17420 19683 20109 25621 29123 32063 43645 28028 17255
Korea Exchange 63663 66567 63163 65002 80291 92641 141042 92788 66613
Kook-Min 2945 6126 10984 31151 23595
Housing & Commercial 12187 8808 8069
Shinhan 10200 12508 14316 18039 23810 33278 51513 38352 33118
Hanmi (KORAM) 2100 2503 2402 2974 4573 8044 14762 11203 7850
Dong-Wha 409 442 965 4320 5367 7218 11802 
Dong-Nam 380 481 557 1360 1399 1539 3171 
Dae-Dong 897 1152 1143 1440 1497 1890 3541 
Hana 9 259 607 2129 2270 3433 5408 4740 8892
Boram 71 123 723 3717 5644 7143 11297 7901
Pyong-Wha 797 3009 3490 3701 4694 3050 2114
Note:  See Table 1. 
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 Table A4: Foreign-Currency Loans and Deposits (US $) 
 Year 
Loans in Foreign Currency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 31299 30466 35826 46546 64674 87743 96020 37963 32306
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 31867 33129 34314 34896 41365 55337 68681 76200 71763
Korea First 29897 35527 38630 51699 62446 64087 67131 25318 14547
Hanil 27870 29833 36429 45035 65226 81304 104380 43959  
Seoul 23636 25106 24949 31748 37675 39830 45797 19963 14500
Korea Exchange 86381 84907 78366 80548 103869 115082 147998 66088 55977
Kook-Min         3810 7610 11526 22187 19828
Housing & Commercial             12788 6274 6781
Shinhan 13840 15954 17762 22353 30802 41339 54054 27316 27831
Hanmi (KORAM) 2849 3193 2980 3685 5916 9993 15490 7979 6597
Dong-Wha 555 564 1197 5353 6943 8966 12384    
Dong-Nam 516 614 691 1685 1810 1912 3327    
Dae-Dong 1217 1469 1418 1784 1937 2348 3716    
Hana 12 330 753 2638 2937 4265 5675 3376 7472
Boram 96 157 897 4606 7301 8873 11854 5627  
Pyong-Wha     989 3729 4515 4598 4925 2172 1777
Deposits in Foreign Currency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 19427 20991 27029 30804 34400 48440 94261 39377 36288
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 26756 30807 38323 39679 44613 48082 88576 64821 53512
Korea First 23965 22598 29526 31302 34969 31415 84390 35099 29940
Hanil 26281 28416 37695 42739 49351 54296 100949 33954  
Seoul 15988 15633 19504 23254 27701 32405 65418 26756 16794
Korea Exchange 76129 80552 79541 79390 98537 103963 161375 59946 67751
Kook-Min         5577 5205 7614 12810 8423
Housing & Commercial             7877 2255 1570
Shinhan 8505 9963 14527 18812 22946 26604 46179 24627 22065
Hanmi (KORAM) 3731 3371 4191 4924 6413 7368 12146 8359 6436
Dong-Wha 963 1119 2365 6172 7781 9399 15132    
Dong-Nam 380 503 926 2052 2458 2711 8463    
Dae-Dong 570 746 1748 2301 2728 2884 5142    
Hana 53 474 2336 3694 4517 4348 8260 7623 7966
Boram 68 339 2200 5276 6872 8578 10808 5895  
Pyong-Wha     1285 4160 5242 5478 7847 2685 1629
Note: See Table 1. 
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 Table A5: Domestic Branches and Full-Time Employment 
 Year 
Domestic Branches 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 285 309 334 356 398 444 485 421 477 
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 262 279 299 321 354 442 513 446 699 
Korea First 276 291 316 345 384 403 413 339 336 
Hanil 264 283 301 329 360 439 478 421
Seoul 287 299 306 319 339 355 357 291 291 
Korea Exchange 225 239 266 291 326 382 400 326 281 
Kook-Min 478 499 511 546 588 
Housing & Commercial 499 545 538 
Shinhan 108 126 147 165 185 198 223 247 250 
Hanmi (KORAM) 57 61 71 81 98 109 122 218 216 
Dong-Wha 48 59 75 97 115 125 138 
Dong-Nam 46 58 72 85 92 105 119 
Dae-Dong 46 67 82 94 97 103 107 
Hana 14 34 48 65 86 99 110 173 277 
Boram 13 30 49 63 78 90 99 104
Pyong-Wha 14 59 70 86 98 108 87 87 
Full-Time Employment 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cho-Hung 10006 9874 9497 8969 9020 9259 9026 5820 6,960 
Sang-Up (Hanvit) 9522 9445 8911 8445 8230 8204 8350 5785 11,134 
Korea First 9276 8949 8817 8738 8748 8341 7990 4870 4,815 
Hanil 9617 9503 9069 8654 8593 8707 8676 5781
Seoul 10279 9969 9562 8957 8676 8311 7524 4817 4,713 
Korea Exchange 8431 8406 8155 8360 8464 8840 8705 5910 5,747 
Kook-Min 14701 14244 13515 11230 11,453 
Housing & Commercial 12195 8538 8,973 
Shinhan 3692 3863 4111 4323 4586 4749 4730 4597 4,464 
Hanmi (KORAM) 1578 1721 1765 1892 2096 2200 2224 2864 2,973 
Dong-Wha 1597 1818 1990 2094 2192 2220 2156 
Dong-Nam 1174 1364 1530 1654 1748 1851 1871 
Dae-Dong 1160 1369 1591 1773 1804 1898 1959 
Hana 522 785 1045 1277 1456 1613 1732 2071 3,333 
Boram 664 787 972 1202 1400 1547 1581 1218
Pyong-Wha 599 1003 1305 1621 1765 1831 1329 1,300 
Note:  See Table 1. 
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 Table A6: Panel Regressions of Return on Assets: 1991-1998 
Variable 
 
ROA 
L/A -0.0174 
(-0.85) 
-0.0182 
(-0.83) 
-0.0248 
(-1.18) 
-0.0588* 
(-2.67) 
-0.0670* 
(-2.73) 
-0.0571**
(-2.36)
WL/L  -0.0228 
(-0.77) 
-0.0320 
(-1.05) 
 -0.0457 
(-1.44) 
-0.0450
(-1.46)
REL/WL   -0.1310 
(-1.58) 
  -0.0936
(-1.07)
CL/WL   0.0192 
(0.39) 
  0.0274
(0.47)
CIL/WL   0.0589 
(1.30) 
  0.0647
(1.25)
FCL/L  -0.0575 
(-1.63) 
-0.0507 
(-1.45) 
 -0.0616‡ 
(-1.77) 
-0.0587‡
(-1.67)
S/A 0.0194 
(0.81) 
-0.0025 
(-0.10) 
-0.0151 
(-0.58) 
-0.0107 
(-0.41) 
-0.0251 
(-0.89) 
-0.0306
(-1.08)
D/A -0.0406‡ 
(-1.76) 
-0.0418‡ 
(-1.78) 
-0.0333 
(-1.35) 
-0.0747* 
(-3.14) 
-0.0681* 
(-2.74) 
-0.0474‡
(-1.76)
TD/WD  0.0238 
(1.28) 
0.0223 
(1.20) 
 0.0275 
(1.26) 
0.0368‡
(1.70)
FCD/D  -0.0133 
(-0.63) 
-0.0251 
(-1.23) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.01) 
-0.0087
(-0.38)
E/A 0.2889* 
(9.00) 
0.2757* 
(7.05) 
0.2338* 
(5.89) 
0.2192* 
(5.70) 
0.2261* 
(5.36) 
0.1966*
(4.57)
NII/II 0.1046* 
(6.47) 
0.0899* 
(5.25) 
0.1061* 
(5.98) 
0.0843* 
(5.21) 
0.0729* 
(4.27) 
0.0884*
(4.73)
NIE/IE -0.1190* 
(-5.84) 
-0.1068* 
(-4.93) 
-0.1088* 
(-5.09) 
-0.0901* 
(-4.02) 
-0.0831* 
(-3.67) 
-0.0823*
(-3.57)
PLL/L -0.6498* 
(-6.48) 
-0.6915* 
(-6.95) 
-0.6134* 
(-6.25) 
-0.7137* 
(-7.33) 
-0.7370* 
(-7.56) 
-0.6712*
(-6.70)
BNCH 0.0001** 
(2.62) 
0.0001** 
(2.62) 
0.0001* 
(3.41) 
0.0001* 
(3.67) 
0.0001* 
(3.44) 
0.0001*
(3.91)
EMPL 0.0065* 
(5.21) 
0.0067* 
(5.39) 
0.0071* 
(5.79) 
0.0065* 
(5.27) 
0.0069* 
(5.22) 
0.0071*
(5.40)
A -0.0003 
(-1.40) 
-0.0003 
(-1.17) 
-0.0004‡ 
(-1.82) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.03) 
-0.0004 
(-1.58) 
-0.0004‡
(-1.83)
UNEM    0.0333 
(0.10) 
-0.0949 
(-0.26) 
-0.2380
(-0.66)
DGDP    -0.3208** 
(-2.39) 
-0.3404** 
(-2.19) 
-0.2732‡
(-1.78)
DEXCH    0.0734** 
(2.50) 
0.0858** 
(2.30) 
0.0802**
(2.21)
SUR    1.1140* 
(2.89) 
0.9885** 
(2.46) 
0.5303
(1.23)
INF    0.4242* 
(2.81) 
0.4576* 
(2.82) 
0.3992**
(2.52)
Adjusted R2 0.8588 0.8643 0.8789 0.8760 0.8784 0.8860
SEE 0.0078 0.0076 0.0072 0.0073 0.0072 0.0070
Note: See Table 3. The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA) as a fraction. 
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Table A7: Panel Regressions of Return on Equity: 1991-1998 
Variable 
 
ROE 
L/A 0.2216 
(0.69) 
0.1622 
(0.47) 
-0.0477 
(-0.15) 
-0.5478‡ 
(-1.66) 
-0.7766** 
(-2.07) 
-0.6870‡
(-1.88)
WL/L  -0.2808 
(-0.54) 
-0.4149 
(-0.89) 
 -0.7892 
(-1.62) 
-0.7344
(-1.58)
REL/WL   -2.6099** 
(-2.06) 
  -2.1234
(-1.60)
CL/WL   0.7719 
(1.02) 
  0.4685
(0.54)
CIL/WL   0.8300 
(1.20) 
  0.4757
(0.61)
FCL/L  -0.5261 
(-0.44) 
-0.6430 
(-1.20) 
 -0.6679 
(-1.26) 
-0.7478
(-1.41)
S/A 0.9125** 
(2.45) 
0.6890‡ 
(1.67) 
0.3663 
(0.93) 
0.5208 
(1.33) 
0.4347 
(1.01) 
0.1640
(0.38)
D/A -0.5205 
(-1.46) 
-0.4570 
(-1.31) 
-0.6099 
(-1.62) 
-1.1204* 
(-3.14) 
-1.1279* 
(-2.98) 
-1.0254**
(-2.52)
TD/WD  0.3273 
(1.10) 
0.1445 
(0.51) 
 0.0740 
(0.22) 
0.1284
(0.39)
FCD/D  -0.0600 
(-0.18) 
-0.2023 
(-0.65) 
 0.0102 
(0.03) 
-0.0172
(-0.05)
E/A 2.9162* 
(5.95) 
3.0463* 
(4.89) 
2.1530* 
(3.55) 
2.0198* 
(3.50) 
2.0945* 
(3.26) 
1.5974**
(2.46)
NII/II 1.1855* 
(4.73) 
1.0462* 
(3.84) 
1.4140* 
(5.22) 
0.8107* 
(3.34) 
0.7238* 
(2.78) 
1.0822*
(3.83)
NIE/IE -1.5417* 
(-4.88) 
-1.4910* 
(-4.32) 
-1.6397* 
(-5.03) 
-1.1551* 
(-3.44) 
-1.1209* 
(-3.24) 
-1.2715*
(-3.65)
PLL/L -12.8859* 
(-8.30) 
-13.2273* 
(-8.34) 
-11.9266* 
(-7.61) 
-13.6196* 
(-9.32) 
-13.7154* 
(-9.23) 
-12.3684*
(-8.18)
BNCH 0.0011** 
(2.48) 
0.0011** 
(2.13) 
0.0013* 
(2.70) 
0.0016* 
(3.23) 
0.0016* 
(3.06) 
0.0017*
(3.17)
EMPL 0.0724* 
(3.77) 
0.0765* 
(3.87) 
0.0847* 
(4.55) 
0.0696* 
(3.74) 
0.0746* 
(3.70) 
0.0849*
(4.27)
A -0.0062‡ 
(-1.77) 
-0.0054 
(-1.50) 
-0.0073** 
(-2.19) 
-0.0077** 
(-2.27) 
-0.0075** 
(-2.13) 
-0.0080**
(-2.30)
UNEM    4.1481 
(0.87) 
4.3979 
(0.79) 
1.4285
(0.26)
DGDP    -4.0505** 
(-2.01) 
-4.2570‡ 
(-1.80) 
-3.6448
(-1.57)
DEXCH    0.9094** 
(2.06) 
1.0770‡ 
(1.89) 
1.0805‡
(1.97)
SUR    21.1851* 
(3.66) 
21.2930* 
(3.47) 
13.4052**
(2.06)
INF    5.8862** 
(2.59) 
6.1392** 
(2.48) 
5.2156**
(2.18)
Adjusted R2 0.8291 0.8262 0.8577 0.8592 0.8571 0.8690
SEE 0.1202 0.1212 0.1097 0.1091 0.1099 0.1052
Note: See Table 3. The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE) as a fraction.  
